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Withdrawal from criminal prosecutions: Legal
dimensions
AJAYAGOVIND

Introduction
Maintenance of law and order is a basic function of every government, and
enforcement of criminal law is an integral part of this function. In any country governed
by rule of law, the government is under a legal obligation to enforce criminal law , and the
law of land lays down elaborate procedure in this regard. Nevertheless, practically every
legal system leaves some residual discretion to the Executive with regard to prosecution
of criminal offences, and this discretion may take two forms: (a) the discretion whether to
prosecute a person at all for a criminal offence; and (b) the power of Executive to grant
pardon to a person convicted of an offence. The former is popularly called as nolle
prosequi i.e, refusal to prosecute, and the latter is known as prerogative of mercy.l The
present paper deals only with the former aspect of the Executive discretion.
Under English law, the Attorney-General, at any time before the conviction can enter
nolle prosequi. This nolle prosequi signifies an entry on record, of a statement, that the
prosecutor will proceed no further in his action. This power of Auorney-General is not in
any way subject to control by a court of law.2 As for Indian legal system, section 333 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, provided for this power. It read:
At any stage of any trial before a High Court under this code, before the return of the
verdict, the Advocate-General may, if he thinks fit, inform the Court on behalf of the
Government, that he will not further prosecute the defendant upon the charge; and
thereupon, all proceedings on such charge against the dependant shall be stayed, and
he shall be discharged of from the same. But such discharge shall not amount to an
acqu,iuaI, unless the presiding Officer otherwise directs.
The power of Advocate-General under the code of criminal procedure was pari materia
with that of Attorney-General
in England. In addition, section 494 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1898, provided for the withdrawal from prosecution by a public
prosecutor. Section 494 provided:
I
"Any public prosecutor may, with the consent of the court, in cases tried by the jury
before the return of the verdict, and in other cases before the judgement is
pronounced, withdraw from the prosecution of any person."
The power of public prosecutor to withdraw from a criminal prosecution was
obviously narrower than that of an Advocate-General, because the former, unlike the
lauer, could be exercised only subject to the consent of comt of law. In actual practice,
however, the power of public prosecutor assumes greater significance, since most of the
criminal prosecutions are initiated by him. Once a verdict is handed down by a judge, this
1.
2.

Both ihe lenns "nollep prosequi" and "prerogative of mercy" are used in the context of English
Constitutional Law.
Halsbury. Laws of EnglaNi, 4ih Ed. Vol. ITPara 222.
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power becomes dysfunctional; and therefore, there would be little scope for the exercise of
nolle prosequi by Advocate-General. Probably for this reason, one does not come across
many reported instances of the exercise of nolle prosequi by Advocate-General in India. In
the new Code of Criminal Procedure, enacted by Parliament in 1973, the provision
concerning Advocate-General was altogether dropped; and section 494 of the old Code reappears as section 321 of the present Code.

Section 321: Historical development
The power of public prosecutor to withdraw from prosecution found expression in the
.very fIrst Code of Criminal Procedure introduced by British Government in 1872. Section
61 of this Code provided that the Public Prosecutor may with the consent of the Court
withdraw any charge against any person in any case of which he is in charge, and upon
such withdrawal, if it is made while the case is under inquiry, the accused person shall be
discharged, and if it is made when he is under trial, the accused shall be acquitted.
In the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882, this power reappeared in section 494, and
this section makes the concept more explicit. Section 494 provided:
Any public prosecutor, appointed by the Governor-General or Local Government,
may, with the consent of the court in cases tried by jury before the return of the
verdict, and in other cases before the judgement is pronounced withdraw from the
prosecution of any person, and upon such withdrawal (a) if it is made before the
charge has been framed the accused shall be discharged and (b) if it is made after a
charge has been made, or when under this code, no charge is required, he shall be
acquitted.
The above section makes it quite clear that the power of withdrawal may be exercised
at any time staring from the time of preliminary inquiry, but it has to be exercised before
the delivery of the judgement. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, reproduced the
above provision verbatim. The amendment introduced to the Code in 1923, however,
deleted the expression "appointed by the Governor-General and Local Government" and
added the clause" either generally or in respect of anyone or more offences for which he is
tried to describe the scope of withdrawal. The effect of 1923 amendment seems to be to
give greater flexibility to Public Prosecutor while exercising his power, in relation to
person charged with several offences.
After India beCame independent, the Government of India Wldertook a comprehensive
review of the Code of Criminal Procedure. At the instance of the Central Government,
successive Law Reform Commissions went into the subject in great detail. All these
efforts culminated in the enactment of a new Code of Criminal Procedure in 1974.
Section 321 of this new Code provides for the power of withdrawal from the prosecution.
This section is reproduction of section 494 of the earlier Code except for proviso that in
relation to offences under Central enactments, the Public Prosecutor shall produce the
permission of the Central Government to withdraw from the case to the court. This
proviso is necessary, because a Public Prosecutor, being an officer of a State
Government, may otherwise frustrate the enforcement of Central enactments, simply by
withdrawing from prosecutions of offences Wlder Central enactments.

Section 321: Legal analysis
Right from the time of its introduction into Indian legal system, the power of
withdrawal from prosecution has been considered and commented upon by courts. There
seems to be unanimity among judges with regard to the applicable principles, though it is
difficult many times to reconcile various final judgements. It is well established that only
a Public-Prosecutor or an Assistance Public Prosecutor actually in-charge of a case can
withdraw from that case. There have been several instances of Governments appointing
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Special Public Prosecutors, apparently to conduct some specific cases but actually to
withdraw from those cases. But even in such cases, the technical requirement is fulf1lled
once the Special Public Prosecutor is in change of a given case.l
Courts have reportedly held that while withdrawing from prosecution, a Public
Prosecutor should act on his own. No doubt, as part of State Executive Machinery, he is
bound to receive directions from his higher ups and the fact that he has actually received
such directions does not necessarily vitiate his decision to withdraw.2 What is germane to
the issue is that he should consider the issue and arrive at his own conclusion. As the
Supreme Court put it, "it is right to remember that the Public Prosecutor, though an
executive officer, is in a larger sense, also an officer of the court and that he is ,bound to
assist the court with his considered view". In the felicitous words of Krishna Iyer, I, the
question is whether the decision (to withdraw) is actually made or only obeyed by the
Public Prosecutor. It may be noted that unlike the Advocate-General who would act as
representative of the State while withdrawing from a given prosecution, the Public
Prosecutor is supposed to act as an officer of the court, dedicated to the administration of
justice ..
The actual practice has however, shown that is too tall an order to expect a Public
Prosecutor to act independently of Executive machinery. In most of the reported cases,
one would see the Public Prosecution just reproducing the direction of District Magistrate
or other authorities in his application for withdrawal.3 Where there is some doubt as to
the willingness of Public Prosecutor to comply with Executive demands, a Special Public
Prosecutor can well be appointed. Under these circumstances the only honest course left
to a Public Prosecution who disagrees with the Executive is to resign. We have not heard
so far any public prosecutor resigning a la Archibold Cox, in the U.S.A. during President
Nixon's regime. If one is serious about the independence of Public Prosecutor, the real
solution would be to dissociate Public Prosecutor from Executive hierarchy and make
them part of the judicial system. But that would call for the drastic modification of the
existing system.
The Public Prosecutor, while applying for withdrawal, is actually performing an
executive function, an extension of the inquiry and investigation
in course of
administration of criminal law. In his application he is supposed to state the conclusions,
that he had arrived at the end of inquiry. The court while granting its consent is
performing a judicial function, and therefore it has to exercise its judicial discretion. As a
judicial determination, it is subject to review and correction by the High Court: The
Supreme Court, in State of Bihar v R.N.Pandey, laid down the guidelines for granting or
withholding consent.4 It was pointed out by the Supreme Court in this case that the
Court while grating the consent has to satisfy itself that the executive function of the
Public Prosecutor has not been improperly exercised, or it is not an attempt to interfere
with the normal course of justice. At the same time, the consent should not be treated as
prima facie determination of a triable issue, and therefore, the discharge, resulting
therefrom need not always conform to the standard of "No prima facie case" or
"groundlessness" under the Cr. P.C ..
How can a court of law ensure that the executive power (or public Prosecutor) is not
abused without making a prima facie determination of the issue placed before it?
Speaking for the Supreme Court in the above case, compared the
Iagannadhadas,

I.

1.
2.
3.
4.

Sheonandafl Paswafl v Stale of Bihar AIR 1983 SC 194.
Ibid
Dy. AccolUlJanJGeneral v Stale of Kerala AIR 1970 Ker. 158.
AIR 1957 SC 389 at 393.
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function of a judge in this regard to that of a Judicial Magistrate at various stages of
investigation of offences by police. For example, a Magistrate has to decide: (i) whether it
is necessary to detain an arrested person beyond twenty four hours; (ii) whether it is
necessary to issue a search warrant; and (iii) whether it is necessary to order further
investigations etc. In all these cases, though the initiative lies with the police, the
Magistrate has to make decision; and he has to exercise his discretion with reference to
such materials as is by then available. The function of Magistrate is supplementary to the
practice, but at same time, to prevent the abuse of power by police. None of the decisions
taken by the Magistrate in these areas should be considered as prima facie judicial
determination of specific issues. The function of a judge under section 321 is analogous
to the above functions, rather than to judicial trials.
Section 321 does not specifically require that the Judicial Magistrate or the Sessions
Court, seized with the case should give reasons for consenting or refusing to consent the
withdrawal of the case. In pre-independent India, there was difference of opinion among
High Courts as to the requirement to give reasons.! There was no authoritative
determination by the Supreme Court in this regard. Any how, once it is accepted that the
order is subject to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, it is incumbent upon the
lower courts to give reasons and so fat, the problem has not cropped up.
Reasons

for

withdrawal

from

the prosecution

It was conceded from the beginning that the power of a Public Prosecutor is quite
wide and he may exercise this power for juridical reasons stricto sensu as well as nonjuridical reasons. By juridical reasons, we mean the paucity of evidence or other reasons
connected with successful proStcution of the case. Thus if the public prosecutor doubts
the credibility of information, he would be within his rights to withdraw from the case on
the ground that it would be vexatious litigation.2 Similarly where it is necessary to
examine an accused person as a witness for prosecution for the other accused person, the
Public Prosecutor may withdraw the case against the former provided he cannot gather
that particular piece of evidence from any other source.3 Thus it is well settled that a
Public Prosecutor may exercise his power to do justice in a given case.
The administration of justice, however, has larger dimensions transcending the legal
justice in a given case. Thus the withdrawal in a given case, though unjustified in the
context of the case, may nevertheless be justified by reference to larger considerations of
public interest. In the words of Krishna Iyer, J. "the interests of public justice may
transcend and overflow the legal justice of a particular litigation."4 This consideration may
be apposite, when the prosecution is likely to lead to violent emotional outburst by
general public. The enforcement of law in a narrow positivistic sense may have to give
way to the expediency of situation. Thus the inexpediency of the prosecution for reasons
of state or public policy has always been considered as a valid ground for the withdrawal
from the prosecution. In order to distinguish the reasons hereunder from the reasons
associated with the prosecution of a given case, we may characterize them as non-juridical
reasons. The role o~/a public prosecutor becomes controversial, when he exerc;ises his
power for non-juridiCal reasons.

A. Juridical

reasons

The paucity of evidence can be a legitimate consideration for the withdrawal from
prosecution. But opinions may differ as to whether there is sufficient evidence or not in a
1.
2.
3.
4.

Ralanlal &: Dhirajlal, The Code of Criminal Proceduu, 13th Ed. (Nagpur 1987) P. 347.
Giribala Dasi v Mader Gazi AIR 1932 Cal699.
Harihar Singh v Emperor AIR 1936 Cal356.
Balwam Singh v Slale of Bihar AIR 1977 SC 2265 at p. 2266.
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given case. In fact, many cases have been taken up to the Supreme Court for final
decisions and even in final decisions, there have been majority and dissenting opinions.
State of Bihar v R.N. Pandey was one of the earliest cases decided by the Supreme Court
in this area. In this case, one R.N. Pandey filed a FIR against 28 persons with regard to
the murder of a peon in a colliery in the course of a riot. The Magistrate before whom the
case was brought, was about to commit it to Sessions. At this stage, the Public
Prosecutor sought to withdraw the case against one Mahesh Desai, on~ of the accused, on
the ground that on the evidence available it would not be just and expedient to proceed
with the prosecution of Mahesh Desai. When the application was so made, there was no
evidence on record except FIR, and police investigations based thereupon. The magistrate
sanctioned the withdrawal against which a revision petition was filed in the High Court,
The High Court allowed the petition on the ground that it was premature to decide about
the sufficiency of evidence even before the evidence was taken.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the High Court mainly on two grounds:
(1)

It is possible for the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from prosecution at any
stage including the stage of preliminary inquiry. In this connection, the Supreme
Court specifically rejected the argument that the expression "trial" is used in
section 321 in a narrow sense, because it would imply that the discretion of a
Public Prosecutor to withdraw would be confined to specific stages of
prosecution; and

(2)

To accept the decision of the High Court would mean that the court could
exercise its judicial discretion only with reference to judicially recorded evidence,
and the Supreme Court held that "this would be en grafting upon the wide terms .
. . of sections 494 an exception or proviso." In other words the court can go into
all available evidence including police records to ensure that the withdrawal is
legitimate.

In the above case, the Supreme Court went into FIR and found that R.N. Pandey
filed that FIR on the basis of information supplied by others. On the basis of police bad
records that there was no substance in the information so supplied, the Supreme Court
upheld the withdrawal from prosecution. In other words, the Supreme Court went by the
police records of the case without any judicially recorded evidence and allowed the
withdrawal from the case.
The implication of this judgment seems to be that while appreciating the value of
evidence for the purpose of determining paucity of evidence, the court will not go by the
standards of Indian Evidence Act. They may consider police records also, which have a
restricted role in comparison with statements made under the oath. But they did not
hesitate to come down upon them, when the records reveal gross arrogance and negligence
of duty. In Bansi/al v ChandulaU The Public Prosecutor sought to withdraw the case on
the ground that "the prosecution does not want to produce the evidence and continue the
criminal matter against the accused." The Sessions Judge granted the permission, because
"It appears futile to refuse the permission, if the prosecution is reluctant to prove the case
against the accused." The Supreme Court felt offended and ruled that "this attitude does
not certainly serve the purpose of administration of justice."
The difficulty in procuring evidence, financial expenses, delay etc., cannot be valid
grounds for withdrawal from prosecution. In M.N.S. Nair v Balakrishnan.2 The grounds
for withdrawal were: (a) the trial which had begun in 1963 had not made any headway and
1.
2.

AJR 1976 SC 370.
AIR 1972 SC 496.
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(b) it is difficult and expensive to get witnesses from far-flung places such as Bombay,
Calcutta etc. The Supreme Court rejected the arguments on the ground that these were not
considerations which would facilitate the administration of justice.
Balwant Singh v State of Biharl and Subhash Chander v State2 are pari materia and
happened to be decided by the same judge, Krishna Iyer, J. In both the cases, certain
persons were charged with criminal offences and the police carried out the necessary
investigations. When the trials were about to begin, the police carried out second
investigations without the knowledge of courts 'and found that the previous information
was wrong; and the Public Prosecutor sought to withdraw on the ground of paucity of
evidence. Though Krishna Iyer, J. was critical of the behaviour of police in both the
cases, he allowed the petition in the first case, while rejected it in the second case. This
only goes to show that the evidence has to be appreciated in all its details; and no hard and
fast rule can be laid down in this regard.
B.

Non-juridical

reasons

When a prosecution is sought to be withdrawn for reasons other than those connected
with the merits of the case, such reasons could be characterised as non-juridical reasons.
Mainly, they fall under two categories:
(1)

Offences involving large number of people, such as group clashes, strikes,
communal disturbances etc.,

(2)

Political offences, which in a way may be the extension of the first category,
but are likely to possess additional ideological dimension.

It may be conceded that the rule of law in a narrow, positivistic sense may have to
give way to social realities, which in legal parlance are characterized as "reasons of state",
"considerations of public policy" etc., but disregard of law, if allowed indiscriminately, is
sure to undermine the foundations of orderly existence. Herein lies the judicial dilemma of
devising a suitable and manageable legal standard which has to take into account every
possible consideration. Of course, courts often respect the Executive determination of the
issue, but this respect should not be allowed to degenerate into subservience.
In State of Orissa v Chandrika Mohapatra,3 there was a clash between rival trade
unions and quite a few arrests were made. Subsequently, the prosecution against them
were sought to be withdrawn with a view to maintaining the calm following the storm.
Bhagwathi, J. speaking for the court, upheld the withdrawal:
The State felt that it would not be conducive to the interest of justice to continue the
prosecution against respondents, since the prosecution, with the possibility of
conviction of the respondents would rouse feelings of bitterness. and antagonism and
disturb the calm and peaceful atmosphere prevailing in industrial undertaking. We
cannot forget that ultimately every offence has a social and economic cause behind it
and if the State feels that the elimination and eradication of the social and economic
cause is better served by not proceeding with the prosecution, the State should be at
liberty to withdraw from the prosecution.4
R.KJain v State,S is the leading case wherein the concept of political offences was
articulated by the Supreme Court in the context of a constitutional government. During

1.
2.
3,
4.
5,

AIR 1977 SC 2265.
AIR 1980 SC 423.
AIR 1977 SC 903.
Ibid at 907.
AIR 1980 SC 1510. This is IJOpularlyknown as Baroda Dynamite case involving George Fernandes.
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the Emergency period (i.e. 1975-76). George Fernandes, a leading figure against Mrs.
Gandhi's Government, was arrested and charged under section 121 A of Indian Penal Code
i.e. waging war against the Government of India. When the prosecution was pending,
Janata Government came to power and sought to withdraw from the prosecution. But by
the time the case came before the Supreme Court, the Congress Government under Mrs.
Gandhi came back to power. It should be said to the credit of Mrs. Gandhi that she did not
interfere in the proceedings in any way.
The Public Prosecutor's submission was that "in public interest and changed
circumstances, the Central Government has desired to withdraw from the prosecution of
the accused." The magistrate sanctioned the withdrawal on the ground that it was
expedient to accord the consent. R.K. Jain challenged the order on the ground that
expediency should not be a consideration for a judiciary to decide issues. As against this,
the Government contended that the political nature of the offence was a valid consideration
for the withdrawal. In other words, the said offence albeit an offence covered by I.P.C;
was directed against Mrs. Gandhi's Government which was rejected in polls. In view of
the fact that 1977 elections were fought on the issue of Emergency and Congress (I) was
decisively defeated, any act against the Emergency should be deemed to be at least
condoned, if not positively approved, by the people. R.K. Jain opposed this argument by
pointing out that I.P.C. does not recognise any category known as political offence; and
the law should take its course irrespective of the motive behind the offence.
Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the Court, noted that the expression "political
offence" is used in International Law and Extradition Act; and therefore, it is legally
recognized concept. It meant an act against the Government; and it is not necessary that
all such acts
should be condoned. For example, murdering of Mahatma Gandhi in
a way could be characterized as political offence since Godse was motivated to commit it
not by personal animosity, but by policy considerations. But this motivation was never
considered as an excuse, because people never approved it. On the other hand, in the
present case, in view of the avowed policy of Janata Party towards Emergency and the
Party's victory in the polls, the withdrawal could be considered as the application of
Janata's policy approved by the people".l
The mechanical extension of the above proposition could mean that any political
party which romps home in the hustings could treat electoral verdict as the condonation of
all its misdeeds by the people. It is in this arena that the mettle of judiciary would be put
to the severest test. Sheonandan Paswan v State of Bihar is a case in point In 1978, the
Government of Bihar, headed by Karpuri Thakur, instituted a criminal case of corruption
and embezzlement against the erstwhile Chief Minister, Jagannatha Mishra and some of
his associates. When the case was in progress, Jagannatha Mishra won the election and
become Chief Minister again. The first thing he did thereafter was to persuade his Cabinet
to take a policy decision to withdraw all cases instituted on account of political vendetta.
A special Public Prosecutor was soon appointed to handle the case pertaining Mishra; and
as expected, he applied for the withdrawal for the following reasons:

1.
2.

(a)

lack of the prospect of successful prosecution in the light of evidence;

(b)

implications of persons as a result of personal vendetta;

(c)

the inexpediency of prosecution for reasons of state and public policy; and

(d)

the adverse effects that the continuation will bring upon the public interest in the
light of the changed circumstances.

Ibid at p. 914.
AIR 1983 SC 194.
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The Chief Judicial Magistrate, before whom the case was pending allowed the
withdrawal, and the case fmally came before the Supreme Court. The Bench consisting of
Bahrul Islam, J. Misra, J. and Tulzapurkar, J. heard the case and rejected the petition with
Tulzapukar, J., dissenting.
The gravamen of the charge was that the Chairman of Patna Urban Co-operative
Bank, N.K. Sinha, misappropriated the resources of the Bank:. According to Reserve Bank:
of India audit reports, N.K. Sinha should be held liable for the bad loans to the tune of the
Rs. 12 lakhs and misappropriation to the tune of the 25 lakhs. On the basis of this
report, the Registrar of Co-operative Societies recommended the legal action, both
criminal and civil, against him and the Secretary of the Department of Law and Justice
concurred with him. When the prosecution was about to be initiated, Jagannatha Mishra,
who was Minister of Agricultural at that time, intervened and recalled the file from the
Public Prosecutor. His justification was that though the Chief Minister was the Law
Minister, he was actually looking after the Department. Mishra sat over the file for next
two and half months, till the time he himself became the Chief Minister. Soon thereafter,
i.e. on 16.5.73, he passed an order with regard to N.K. Sinha case as follows:
(a)

there is no case of defalcation against N.K. Sinha;

(b) action should be taken against loanees to recover the bad loans;
(c)

in case there is any difficulty in recovering the loans, the surcharge proceedings
should be initiated against the Board of Directors; and

(d)

normal working conditions should be restored in the Bank after calling a general
body meeting.

It was clear from the order that N.K. Sinha was absolved of criminal liability, but the
civil liability continued. Probably, having realised this, Mishra recalled the file once
again, wrote another order bearing an earlier date, i.e. 14.5.75 and pasted it on the original
order. The second order referred only to be fourth part of the first order, i.e. restoring
normal working conditions. The prima facie implication of the second order seems to be
to absolve N.K. Sinha from civil liability also.
L' affair N.K. Sinha continued to dog Mishra ministry thereafter. The Bank was
subsequently liquidated on the order of Reserve Bank and the official Liquidator
recommended the prosecution of N.K. Sinha, but nothing was done about it. When
Karpuri Thakur came to power, he initiated the criminal prosecution against Mishra for
criminal misconduct under section 5(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and
forgery under section 466 of I.P.C. (backdating the order). But before the case made any
headway, Mishra came back to power and sought to withdraw from the case.
It may be noted that the entire case was based upon documentary evidence, and
therefore, could have been easily disposed of. All the three judges of the Supreme Court
went through the evidence and arrived at their own conclusions. Whereas Justice Bahaml
Islam and Mishra did not find any impropriety on the part of Jagannatha Mishra,
Tulzapukar, J. found a prima facie case of wrong doing. The scope of judicial review with
regard to sufficiency of evidence is no doubt limited,! but it is still surprising that two
justices of the Supreme Court blindly accepted the Public Prosecutor's statement ignoring
such weight)' evidence as Reserve Bank Audit Reports. They accepted Jagannatha Mishra's
contention that with regard to surcharge proceedings against the Directors, the Registrar of
1.

"The Court's duty is not to reappreciate the grounds which led the Public Prosecutor to request the
withdrawal from the prose.cution but to consider whether the Public Prosecutor applied his mind as a
free agent, uninfluenced by irrelevant and extraneous considerations."
Per. Chinnappa Reddy J. in R.K. Jain v Slale of Bihar at p. 1516.
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the Co-operatives was the proper authority to initiate action and he did initiate action,
however perfunctory it might be. But there was no explanation for the failure to initiate
criminal prosecution despite the demands by the auditors and the Official Liquidator.
Baharul Islam, J, held that the following considerations would be relevant to the
decision of the Court while deciding about public interest and changed circumstances:
(a) the facts occurred nearly twelve years ago;
(b) knowing human nature, the Government Officials who happened to be the main
witnesses, are unlikely to testify against the Chief Minister;
(c)

the Public Prosecutor, appointed by the government,
case against the Chief Minister.!

is unlikely to pursue the

Mishra, J. went to the extent of saying that the animosity between Karpoori Thakur
and Jagannatha Mishra was evidenced by the speed with which the former's government
proceeded in the case; and therefore, it would not serve any public interest.2
The Supreme Court in M.N.S. Nair case had clearly held that inconvenience in
prosecution due to the passage of time or other reasons cannot be a valid consideration for
the withdrawal. Therefore, the fact that nearly twelve years had elapsed since the
occurrence of the facts cannot be a valid consideration, and it would be all the more so,
since Jagannatha Mishra himself contributed to the delay. Mishra, J. on the other hand,
found fault with the Government for proceeding expeditiously with the case. As for the
remaining points, Tulzapurkar's eloquent dissent answers them. He elaborately discussed
the inexpediency for the reasons of state. He said:
If the offences did not partake any political character nor were committed in nor
followed by any explosive situation involving any emotive issues giving rise to any
surcharged atmosphere or violence, no question of serving any broader cause of public
justice could arise and in absence thereof, the public interest of administering
criminal justice in the particular case could not be permitted to be sacrificed.3
Tulzapukar, J. further noted that ordinary criminal offence involving conspiracy,
bribery and embezzlement with self-aggrandizement and favouritism as the motivating
force cannot be considered as politic;al offences, and therefore, the prosecution cannot be
withdrawn for reasons of state or public policy. The charge of personal or political
vendetta is also irrelevant, if the grounds for prosecution were otherwise justified.
Referring to the argument that the continuation of prosecution in the present case would
adversely affect the public interest in the changed circumstances, the judge ruled that
success in hustings is no licence to sweep all dirt under carpet and such an interpretation
would be contraty to all democratic cannons. As for the effect on the State Government,
the only implication is that the concerned person should step down from the office till the
case is over. Such a step, far from weakening the Government, would actually strengthen
it by reinforcing common man's faith in rule of law.

Reasons of S~ate: a· criti'que
Reasons of State,' considerations
of public policy, expediency,
change in
circumstances, political offences etc. are the terms used to justify the withdrawal from
prosecution. These considerations belong essentially to the domain of policy maker but
the courts are under a bounden duty to ensure that the policy makels shall not abuse their
power. Thus the scope of the supervisory function of the Court remains the same in this
1.
2.
3.

AIR 1983 SC 194 at p. 229.
Ibid at p. 234.
Ibid at p. 207 Tulzapukar. J. accepted the definition of political offence as given in R.K. Jain's case.
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sphere as in the case of other spheres of executive action pertaining to withdrawal from
prosecution.
Viewed from the above point of view, the withdrawal from prosecution against the
alleged terrorist Simranjit Singh Mann could be justified, if it is intended to turn a new
leaf in Punjab politics. But a lame duck Prime Minister doing it on the eve of laying
down his office makes a mockery of the administration of justice. For, it is too much to
say that the outgoing Prime Minister suddenly became convinced of the innocence of the
accused; and on the other hand, if it was for reasons of State, the proper person to do it
should be next Prime Minister, who has to bear the brunt of the decision. It is both
legally relevant and politically appropriate that a decision based on reasons of State should
be taken by a person who has to steer clear the destiny of the State; and rendering the
situationfait accompli before the new Premier could exercise his option would amount to
crass irresponsibility
and the gross abuse of power. It is immaterial that the new
Government, with its professed views in this regard, would have done the same thing; but
the previous Government by doing so, in opposition to its proclaimed stand, exposed
itself to the charges of cowardice, if not outright dishonesty. In other words, a political
decision to be legally valid must, inter alia. be taken under right circumstances by a right
person.
A court of law is not expected to substitute its decision to the decision of policy
maker, but it should not hesitate to balance the decision to withdraw against the need for
regular law enforcement. A withdrawal would be legally valid, only when the benefits of
withdrawal would be clearly evident as against the harmful effects of regular law
enforcement. Thus there is absolutely no reasons to allow ordinary crimes to go
unpunished as in Sheonandan Paswan case. It would be a travesty of justice, if a person
can easily escape conviction, by abusing his authority vested in him for serving the
country. Therefore, this case requires to be overruled at the earliest.

Conclusions
Justice according to law is the ideal of administration of justice in normal course;
but occasions may arise whereunder justice according to law may be viewed by the
community as perpetrating injustice rather than rendering justice, and the prosecution may
turn out to be persecution. It is precisely to meet the situation like this that residual
discretion is vested in the Executive with regard to the enforcement of law.
The legal ideal is that this discretion should be exercised by the concerned law officer
to the best of his judgment, i.e. the Public Prosecutor in Indian context. No doubt as a
lawyer for the Government, he is bound to receive the instructions from the government,
but his loyalty should be to his profession, i.e. administration of justice. It is rather
Paswan case should say that a Public
ironical that Bahrul Islam. J. in Sheonandan
Prosecutor cannot act independently of his Chief Minister, as a stark departure from the
plethora of statements of the contrary made by his predecessor. If it is intended as a
statement of fact, the time has come to redefine his status.
The law leaves wide discretion to the Public Prosecutor as to the considerations
which should guide his decision so that he may meet all kinds of contingencies. Broadly
speaking, he may use his power to do justice in a particular case. In other words, if his
trained mind perceives some flaw in the evidence or other relevant materials, he may put a
full stop to the proceedings so as to stop further harassment of the concerned parties. The
function of the court in such a situation is not to pronounce upon the correCUless of the
decision in the sense whether a prima facie case is made otit, but only to ensure that no
abuse of power has taken place.
The Public Prosecutor's power extends to the withdrawal from prosecution for non
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juridical considerations, such as reasons of state. But it is incumbent upon him that this,
does not render the exercise into one of lawlessness. He has to balance the consequences
of the withdrawal as against the enforcement of law; and only when the former outweighs
the latter very clearly, he should proceed with the withdrawal from the case.

